
Poverty
Reduction and Graduation: Emerging Trends from PKSF-Supported
MFIs*
8.1.
Introduction: Background, Scope and Methodology
From the poverty reduction point of
view the success of MFIs would depend on their ability to reach
out to the poor, provide services that cater to the needs of their
poor members, reduce the current poverty level of their beneficiaries,
and foster a process of graduation of the most disadvantaged sections
among their clients out of poverty.37
The present chapter on "poverty reduction and graduation"
addresses three-fold objectives. First, it seeks to assess the extent
of poverty reduction under microfinance. Second, it attempts to
capture the extent of vulnerability reduction under microfinance.
Third, it provides evidence on the process of graduation of the
poorest members of the MFI clientele out of poverty.
Reduction of Poverty and Vulnerability
under Microfinance
The scope of the work is restricted to the following items of primary
interest:
(a) Analysis of income-poverty
trends by relevant member/ organizational categories between the
first and the third round.
(b) Analysis of the poverty impact
of microcredit based on the analysis of the determinants of household
level consumption and poverty data.
(c) Analysis of the impact of microcredit
on vulnerability of the poor.
proportionately allocate more resources
to investment in human and physical capital even at low level of
food consumption. By investing more resources now in capital accumulation
they aspire to end up in sustained higher level in the subsequent
period. The main hypothesis is that the proportion of such households
would be higher in case of MFI members compared non-members. Accordingly,
the scope of the work under this component of the study would include
the following:
* This was prepared
by Dr. Binayak Sen, Senior Research Fellow, BIDS, Dhaka, Bangladesh
1.
(a)
Analysis of the pattern of investment in physical capital by relevant
membership categories, controlling for their poverty status.
(b) Analysis of the pattern of investment
in human capital by relevant membership categories, controlling
for their poverty status
8.2 Poverty
Measures
The measurement of poverty involves
(a) the specification of the income
level below which a person is considered poor, - (the so called
"income-poverty line") and
(b) construction of an index to measure
the intensity and severity of poverty suffered by those whose income
is below the poverty line. The most widely used measure of poverty
is the so-called 'head count' ratio, i.e., the proportion of people
living below the poverty line.
Sen (1976, 1981) and Kakwani (1980a,
b) have proposed several criteria that a poverty measure must satisfy
to be able to assess the changes in social welfare. First, an increase
in income of a person below the poverty line, with the income of
others remaining the same, must reduce the poverty measure (improvement
in poverty situation). Second, a pure transfer of income to a poor
person from a richer person without making either cross the poverty
line must reduce the poverty measure. Third, a poverty measure is
a characteristic of the poor and not of the general poverty of the
nation. So no fall in income of the people below the poverty line
can be outweighed by any rise in income of the people above the
poverty line. Fourth, the poverty measure must be sensitive to income
distribution among the poor. A given increase in income of a person
far below the poverty line compared with the same increase for a
person near the poverty line must reduce the poverty measure.
The head-count measure of poverty, which
is simple to interpret and hence has appeal to politicians and policymakers,
does not satisfy the above criteria. The measure does not show an
improvement in poverty situation until a poor person has sufficient
increase in income that pushes him or her above the poverty line.
For example, if certain development activities (e.g. Rural Public
Works or Vulnerable Group Development Program) focus on the extremely
poor and succeed in raising their income but not enough to lift
them above the poverty line, success will not be reflected in the
head-count measure of poverty. In contrast, another development
2.
37 The term
"poverty" and "income-poverty" is used interchangeably
in this chapter.
activity (say credit for generation
of self-employment) that focuses mainly on households nearer the
poverty line may succeed in pushing them above the poverty line
with the same or even smaller increases in incomes. From the welfare
point of view, the former is a more desirable outcome than the latter,
but one would draw contrary conclusions from changes in the head-count
measure of poverty. If reduction in intensity and severity of poverty
is the concern, greater weights must be given to the poorer households
among the poor.
Foster et al. (1984) proposed a class of poverty measures that are
additively decomposable and that satisfy all the criteria for an
ideal poverty measure. This measure, known as the FGT index, is
given by
where
n = the number of sample
households,
Z = the estimate of the poverty line income,
q = the number of people whose income is below the poverty line,
Xi = the income of the ith individual among the poor households,
and
a = parameter that reflects the society's weight given to the poverty
problem.
It may be noted that the income of the (n-q) nonpoor households
(with income above the poverty line) does not affect the poverty
measure. The parameter a determines the weight given to the severity
of poverty. If the value of a = 0, society does not distinguish
among the poor and is merely concerned with their number. In this
case, the poverty measure reduces to a head-count ratio that estimates
the "incidence of poverty."
If the value of a = 1, each poor is weighted by his or her relative
distance from the poverty line. The society is indifferent between
an absolute increase in income accruing to a person who is nearer
the poverty line and the same incremental income accruing to the
person who is further away from the poverty line. In this case,
the poverty measure reduces to
3.
This is a measure of the aggregate
poverty gap and shows the percentage of total income needed to be
transferred from the nonpoor to the poor households to lift them
above the poverty line. If this measure is estimated for the subsample
of the poor people, we get Sen's (1981) concept of poverty gap ratio,
which is a measure of the "intensity of poverty".
If a society is particularly
averse to the inequality among the poor, the poverty measure must
give higher weight to an income transfer to the poorer compared
with a less poor household (Kakwani, 1980b). Thus, the value of
a should be more than unity. An improvement in the distribution
of income among the poor through a transfer of income from a moderate
to a hardcore poor, even when the head-count ratio and the poverty-gap
ratio remain unchanged, should be considered desirable from the
welfare point of view. In recent empirical studies on poverty, a
= 2 is commonly used. This is a measure of the severity of poverty
and is estimated by
8.3 Microcredit and Income-Poverty Trends: Evidence from Panel Survey
This section attempts to capture trends in poverty by participation
status in MFIs as emerging between the first and the third rounds,
corresponding to 1997/98 and 1999/00. Altogether a panel of 1526
target households (defined as those with land less than 50 decimals)
has been identified for poverty comparisons. In this present exercise
we use the household income data for estimating poverty. Note that
more relevant measures of poverty comparisons between the two groups
would be FGT poverty-gap and squared poverty-gap since the target
households usually have average income lower than the poverty line.
8.3.1 Participation Categories
Poverty is estimated for three major
participation categories, as defined below:
(a) "regular participants"
who were members of MFIs in all three rounds;
(b) "occasional participants"
who were members of MFIs at some point, either during the period
preceding the survey, or during one of the three survey rounds only;
(c) "non-participants" representing
the traditional control group who never participated in the MFIs.
4.
| Box
1: Do We Need a CPI for the Rural Poor?
CPI for food as applied to the poor ¾ proxied by
food bundles constituting the "food poverty line"
¾ shows a decline by 5.3% between round-1 and round-3
(Table 8.1). CPI for non-food as applied to the poor has
increased by 2.7% during the period. This is in contrast
to the overall rural CPI trends provided by BBS data. According
to the latter, food CPI increased by 7.8% and non-food CIP
¾ by 3.7%
.
Differing trends are possible because of two factors. First,
the rural CPI series constructed by BBS is based on 197
items, which include those not consumed by the rural poor.
Data presented in Table 8.7 relate to minimum "basic
need" items only. It is possible that prices for commodities
consumed by the non-poor increased at a faster rate than
those for the poor. Second, BBS data capture market prices,
while data presented in Table 8.7 relate to mean rural consumer
unit values, i.e., represent a mix of both market and non-market
access to food on the part of the poor.
In light of the above, BBS may think of constructing a separate
rural CPI for the poor (such as CPI for agricultural labourers),
as is done in other countries.
|
8.3.2
A Faster Poverty Reduction Rate for MFI Participants?
Poverty comparisons are carried out for the eligible (target) group
with land-size less than 50 decimals. This is done to control for
the possible differences in the "initial conditions" (such
as land and non-land assets) across participation status. Poverty-gap
ratio, measuring the "depth of poverty", is selected as
the suitable measure for comparison (it is also easier to interpret
than FGT-2 measure). Poverty-gap ratio is simply the product of
head-count ratio ("incidence of poverty") and income-gap
ratio ("intensity of poverty").
It may be seen from the table that initial poverty condition was
not similar across the participation categories in round-1 (Table
8.2). If one goes by the criterion of head-count index, the initial
poverty situation was actually worse for the target participants
than the non-participants (68.4 vs. 62.4 per cent). The conclusion
is reversed when one considers the income-gap index (43.4 vs. 49.0
per cent). The poverty-gap index, which is a synthetic measure of
the above two indicators, appears quite similar between the participants
and the non-participants (29.7 vs. 30.6). Given these ambiguities
regarding the initial poverty ranking between participants and non-participants,
it is desirable to focus on the rate of change of their poverty
5. between
the first and the third round. The contribution of MFI to poverty
reduction should show up in the faster rate of decline in poverty
measures recorded for the regular participants compared with the
non-participants.
The results show that regular participants
have registered a faster rate of poverty reduction than occasional
participants and non-participants. This result is valid for both
head-count and poverty-gap measures. Thus, in case of the regular
participants the poverty-gap index has declined by 13.6 per cent
between the first round and the second round (Table 8.2). This may
be compared with only 10.8 per cent drop recorded for the non-participants
group. Similarly, the proportion of population living in poverty
has gone down by 12.4 per cent in case of the regular participants
compared with only 6.9 per cent for the non-participants during
the same period. The observed difference in the rate of poverty
reduction may be ¾ at least partly ¾ attributable
to MFI impact. It may be noted that the poverty reduction rate estimated
for the occasional participants was higher than in case of non-participants,
but lower than the matched decline registered for the regular participants.38
The fact of faster rate of poverty decline as per the poverty-gap
measure compared with the rate of decline measured on the basis
of head-count index has important implications for assessing the
poverty impact of MFI programs. This implies that benefits from
MFI have not been restricted only to those participants persisting
in and around the poverty line. The less advantaged within the poor
community has also benefited from participating in MFIs. This trend
is pronounced for the regular participants than in case of occasional
participants. The issue of the less advantaged within the poor community
will be examined in the later part of this chapter in the context
of assessing the impact of MFI on fostering the "graduation
process" for the extreme poor.
Has the above result any bearing on assessing the poverty reduction
experience in general in rural areas of Bangladesh for the period
under consideration? The declining trend in poverty
38 The qualitative conclusion about improved
performance of regular participants of MFIs compared with the non-participants
does not change if one uses different price data other than the
prices derived from the PKSF survey for setting the poverty line.
Using the BBS prices for the rural areas for the period we find
a trend of poverty increase across the participation categories.
But, the results still show MFI regular participants in favourable
light: participants have registered a much lower increase in poverty
than the non-participants. The unsuitability of BBS price series
for making poverty comparison for the PKSF panel sample over the
period under consideration has been pointed out earlier in Box 1.
6.
8.3.3 "Small
Is Beautiful"?
Within the category of participants, however, there is a considerable
variation in the poverty reduction rate by MFI characteristics (Table
8.3).
As per the preferred measure
of poverty-gap index, the reduction rate in case of the relatively
small MFIs has been quite comparable to (if not higher than) the
large MFIs. Thus, the poverty-gap index has declined by 39-42 per
cent for the two relatively small NGOs such as "Sabolomby"
and "Prottayshi" compared with 3-10 per cent drop observed
for BRAC and Grameen Bank. The poverty reduction rate for MFI members
with multiple membership with both large and small NGOs has been
assessed at 11 per cent, while the matched figure for "all
others" is 9 per cent.40 The
other aspect noteworthy from the table is that small MFIs have been
equally (if not more) successful in reaching out to the poorer households
than large MFIs. This can be judged by comparing the level of poverty-gap
index between small and large MFIs for the first round. Thus, both
Grameen and BRAC members have lower initial poverty rates compared
with Sabolomby and Prottayshi (25-31 vs. 35-38 per cent). While
the issue of small vs. large MFIs from the poverty reduction point
of view needs to be explored further the evidence is clearly dismissive
of the view that small and local MFIs are necessarily less capable
in implementing anti-poverty policies than large and national MFIs.
The former should get as much policy support as the latter have
enjoyed to date, especially when it comes to expanding the credit
accessibility of the target poor as well as addressing the issue
of covering the left-outs.
8.4.
Determinants of Income-Poverty: Does Participation
in MFIs make a Difference?
Table 8.4 shows that
standard FGT measures are lower for target participants compared
with target non-participants (i.e. households from the same landowning
group of up to 50 decimals).
39This result is in congruence
with the recent results for HES 2000 showing decline in rural poverty
between 1995/96 and 2000
40 The only notable exception in this sample appears to be "
Noabeky", which did not register any decline in poverty, which
may be due to the fact that the area of its operation was severely
affected by the 1998 flood. 7.
This result holds true for both "within program village"
and "across program and control village". However, it
is not clear whether participation in MFIs per se or some other
factors (such as varying initial conditions) are driving this result.
Accordingly, the question we ask in this section is: does participation
in MFIs reduce poverty controlling for the differences in initial
resource endowments at household and community levels? This has
been tested by carrying out analysis in three stages, as described
below.
8.4.1. Multivariate Analysis of the Determinants of Consumption
A typical multivariate model of consumption determination has been
estimated for the poor (Table 8.5) as well as for the target group
as a whole (Table 8.6).41 The results show that, controlling for
possible household level differences in asset endowment, literacy
level, relevant demographic and labour characteristics as well as
variations in village-level income-earning environment measured
with respect to flood-propensity, irrigation and average affluence,
participation in program (the so-called "pure effect"
of program participation) is a significant explanator of average
poor's consumption (Table 8.5). Similar results are noted when the
model is separately run for the target group (Table 8.6). Within
the group of program participants, there is some indication that
average consumption tends to rise with increase in the length of
membership (Table 8.7), displaying signs of household level graduation.
8.4.2. Multivariate Analysis of Determinants
of Poverty
For the completeness of the argument, we estimate the above model,
this time taking poverty-gap (measuring the "depth of poverty")
and squared poverty-gap (measuring the "intensity of poverty")
index as dependent variable. The results show that participation
reduces poverty of the program members measured with respect to
the both dimensions of poverty (Tables 8.8 and 8.9).42 There is
also some indication that poverty reduction effects of the programs
become more pronounced with increase in the length of membership.
These findings reinforced signs of household level graduation. However,
the explanatory power of the model is rather modest. Only
41 See, annex 1 (part b) for the description
of the model.42 See, annex
1 (part a) for the definition of poverty measures. 8.
a quarter of the variation in poverty
rates could be explained by the proposed model. This shows the need
for further probing into the issue of determinants of poverty.
To sum up the discussion
so far, the key finding of this section has been that participation
in micro-credit programs has a positive and significant effect on
poverty status of the program household even after controlling for
the possible differences in the initial conditions and selectivity
biases across participation categories.
9.
8.5 Microcredit and
Vulnerability of the Poor
Rural households face, on a regular
basis, different kinds of crises. They originate from a wide range
of events, such as, natural calamities, income decline due to household
members' illness and subsequent withdrawal from the labor market,
unanticipated extra expenses (such as, on medical treatment or for
social ceremonies), etc. The present Study finds that while the
incidence of crisis faced varies across landownership groups the
incidence of such crises is quite similar across households within
the same wealth/ asset status. Thus, within the land-size group
of 50 decimals the incidence of crisis (i.e. the number of crisis-events
faced by a household in a given period) is similar across target
participants and target non-participants. In short, participation
in the MFI programs does not affect the incidence of facing these
crises by the poor households. However, as we shall observe below,
where participation in MFIs makes a difference is the manner in
which such crises are being coped by the poor households. MFI members
have the ability to take recourse to "soft options" for
crisis coping, while the non-participants within the poor group
have to rely on "hard options".
Poverty reduction is not just about
devising means for income generation; it is also about devising
ways for preventing income erosion. Microfinance can cut both ways,
i.e., by providing the poor the means for generating income as well
as by helping them to better protect against anticipated and unanticipated
risks and shocks. In this section some results are presented which
indirectly highlight the risk-insurance aspect of microfinance.
Risks and shocks in sociological terms are better known as "crisis"
(equivalent to "shankat" and "bipad" in the
vernacular). Some shocks are covariate (as in the case of natural
disaster), some are systematic (as in the case when the poor are
routinely exposed to infectious health risks) while others are idiosyncratic
(such as those associated with personal insecurity). Whatever the
nature of the shocks they can have longer-term consequences depending
on the extent of material and moral damage they entail and the means
of crisis coping available to the poor.
The means of crisis coping can be broadly
grouped into two categories. First, one may analytically separate
out positive coping methods, which rely on the soft options such
as borrowing at zero or low interest, and/or mobilising help and
support from the patrons and kinship network in a variety of forms,
material and moral. Second, one may also highlight 10.
negative coping methods, which are based on the hard options
such as dissaving and asset sales/mortgage, with long-term implications
for debt and recovery. The divide between these two methods of coping
is often blurred, as in the case of "curtailing family consumption
expenditure", which may be a relatively soft option for the
not-so-poor, but may be the last resort for the extreme poor. There
is also the third important analytical aspect in discussing coping
methods, which is the category of "no coping", i.e., when
the minimum means for coping is not available. Accordingly, one
may hypothesise that the incidence of "no coping" would
be less for the program members than for the non-members. Similarly,
the MFI members may have greater options for deploying positive
coping methods than would be case for the non-members.
Data on the aggregate number of "crisis-events" along
with the information on coping methods have been compiled for the
first and the third rounds, and for the eligible group disaggregated
by participation status, as defined in the study. Three points are
noteworthy from Table 8.10 First, if one focuses on the two principal
categories of "negative coping" such as asset sale/mortgage
and dissaving, the stark difference between the regular participants
and occasional participants clearly comes through for the round-1
data. Together they represent about 10 per cent of the total crisis
events for the group of regular participants as opposed to 20 per
cent for the non-participants. Second, the difference in the incidence
of "negative coping" is less apparent in the round-3.
This is because both program members and non-members have been affected
by the preceding year's flood, lead to asset/savings depletion across
participation status. Third, what appears to be a consistent difference
between participants and non-participants in both rounds relates
to the incidence of "no coping", As expected, such incidence
is lower in case of MFI borrowers compared with the non-borrowers.
For the round-1 it is assessed at 11 per cent for the regular participants
vis-a-vis 16 percent for the non-participants. The corresponding
figures for the round-3 is 36 and 40 per cent.11.
8.6 Rethinking "Graduation":
Emerging Trends
8.6.1 Graduation: What it is not
Graduation cannot be seen as a process of graduating out of MFIs
with which the poor is currently associated. MFIs provide important
financial services to the poor based on membership criteria. This
explains continued presence of the poor in MFIs even when there
is perceptible progress in economic and social dimensions of well-being.
There are two approaches
to capturing the idea of graduation at the level of target households:
(a) graduation defined as "process"
of escaping from long-term trap of poverty (call it the "process
view"),
(b) graduation defined as the ability
to cross some pre-identified poverty thresholds (the "threshold
view").
8.6.2 "Process
View" of Graduation
If the objective is to map the "process" graduation as
way of climbing out of long-term inter-generational poverty, then
graduation may be seen as a process of accumulation of critical
minimum "self-development" ability to participate in economic
growth. The key question is whether the MFIs are able to aid the
poor in this process of sustainable poverty reduction. Using a growth
accounting framework, we postulate that the rate of income-poverty
reduction would depend on the rate of physical capital accumulation,
human capital accumulation, and the rate of technological progress.
Households and economic agents--even at similar level of current
income (consumption)-- may differ as to their investment behaviour
with respect to the above three variables of interest. The emphasis
would be to check for systematic differences in the rate of physical
capital accumulation, human capital accumulation, and technological
progress across relevant member and organizational categories.
12.
8.6.3 "Threshold"
View of Graduation
If the objective is to measure
the number of "graduated" people, then the focus shifts
to counting as graduated everybody who has crossed the threshold(s)
in various dimensions of critical minimum ability (however defined).
Some (tentative) examples are given below:
(a) Ability to overcome hunger (with
implications for nutrition-productivity links): households able
to overcome extreme food-poverty
(b) Ability to foster human capital
(with implications for future occupational choice, productivity,
and growth): households able to support primary and secondary education
of boys and girls without dropout
(c) Ability to enhance security against
shocks (with implications for vulnerability): households able to
deploy "positive coping" such as raising emergency loans
from multiple sources
(d) Ability to promote voice and freedom
(with implications for bonding and bridging):
Households without any extra-economic coercion, or some relevant
index of "powerlessness" suitably defined.
In this chapter we have mainly focused on three aspects for which
we have detailed cohort data disaggregated by extreme poverty and
participation status. These are
(a) ability foster human capital,
(b) ability to accumulate physical
capital, and
(c) ability to enhance security against
shocks.
8.6.4 Investment in Human Capital
A higher proportion of regular participants invest in human capital.
As may be seen from Table 3.11, the share of investors in human
capital during the first round of the survey was 56 per cent for
the regular participants compared with 48 and 41 per cent recorded
for occasional and non-participants, respectively. By the third
round the matched share has gone up to 68 per cent for regular participants
as against 59 per cent for occasional participants and 57 per cent
for non-participants. This conclusion does not change even if one
focuses on the extreme poverty group. Between the two round the
corresponding share of investors in the participant extreme poor
group has increased from 61 to 75 per cent. In contrast, the matched
share for the non-participant extreme poverty group has gone up
from 43 to 64 per cent. In short, those among the extreme poor who
participated in MFIs exhibited a more pronounced tendency to invest
in human capital development of their families compared with their
non-participant counterparts. 13.
8.6.5 Investment in Physical Capital
A higher proportion of regular participants invest in physical capital
as well. This is true for both the survey rounds (Tables 8.12 and
8.13). Here we discuss the findings of the last round only and restrict
our comments to the comparative situation of the extreme poor between
the two rounds (Table 8.13). The results show a clear edge of the
participant extreme poor households over non-participant extreme
poor households for a broad range of asset categories. The comparative
examples capturing the proportion of asset owners between the two
categories display the following pattern: radio (25 vs. 19 per cent),
wall clock (40 vs. 29 per cent), rickshaw/van (14 vs. 8 per cent),
bi-cycle (20 vs.12 per cent), hand tubewell (28 vs. 19 per cent),
tree (84 vs. 71 per cent), chair/table (63 vs. 44 per cent), and
bed (91 vs. 81 per cent). A small proportion of extreme poor participants
also own shallow tubewell and engine operated boat, which is non-existent
in case of their counterparts.
Data presented in Tables 8.12 and 8.13, however, represents comparison
for the panel households disaggregated by participation status.
A more defensible comparison would be to carry out cohort comparison,
i.e., track the change of the same group of extreme poor households
over the survey rounds. This is attempted in the next section.
The Cohort Comparison: Results for the Extreme Poor Group
In this section we present the results of the cohort comparison
for the extreme poor group disaggregated by participation categories.
Here we consider the following dimensions, namely, asset, education,
and (emergency) credit availability from the informal market. Each
is reviewed in turn. 14.
Comparison over Asset Dimension
The results for change
in asset acquisition are given in Table 8.14. Here we construct
an aggregate score of major assets for each household in the extreme
poor group for both the rounds. The following aspects are noteworthy.
During the first round the total asset score estimated for the extreme
poor group was only slightly higher in case of regular participants
compared with the non-participants (2.79 vs. 2.22). There has been
a sharp divergence since then: the matched figure for the regular
participants has gone up to 6.37, while that for the non-participants
increased to 5.11. The faster increase in asset accumulation in
the group of participants is suggestive of the favourable impact
of MFIs on the graduation process of the extreme poor through the
physical capital accumulation channel.
Comparison over Educational Enrollment
The school enrollment of children has
been higher for the extreme poor participants group for both the
rounds and for both primary and secondary levels. This further reinforces
the observation previously made with respect to higher share of
investors in human capital among the participants category in general.
Thus, gross enrollment ratio at primary level was 1.03 for the first
round in case of regular participants compared with 0.76 for the
non-participants (Table 8.15). There has been a noticeable reduction
of the enrollment gap between the two categories for the primary
level, possibly reflecting all-round expansion of primary education
in rural areas due to favourable public policy such as Food for
Education. However, in case of secondary level of education where
private decision to educate children is the major explanator, the
participants have a clear edge over the non-participants. Thus,
in case of secondary enrollment the observed rate is twice as high
in the participant group compared with the non-participants. This
finding is suggestive of favourable impact of MFIs on the graduation
process of the extreme poor through the human capital accumulation
channel.
Comparison
over Credit Accessibility
The credit access to informal market for meeting emergency contingencies
is an important indicator of the graduation process. Previously
we have observed that MFIs have a favourable impact on reducing
vulnerability of the poor households in general. Participants are
likely to 15.
deploy positive coping method involving "soft option"
such as interest-free loans while the non-participants face the
risks of using "hard option" such as asset sale and dissaving.
Data presented in Table 8.16 further suggests that credit accessibility
to "neighbours" has increased for the extreme poor regular
participants while it has considerably reduced for the non-participants.
The average size of loan that can be mobilised from the neighbours
is twice as high in case of regular participants compared with the
non-participants. In contrast, the dependence on moneylenders, who
advance relatively high interest loans, has slightly declined for
the participants but slightly gone up for the non-participants.
In general this finding combined with the previous observation on
vulnerability-coping is suggestive of favourable impact of MFIs
on the graduation process of the extreme poor through the informal
(emergency) credit access channel. 16.
Table
8.1
Mean Rural Consumer Unit Values Calculated
from HES: PKSF Survey (Round - 1 and Round - 3)
PKSF
Regions |
Per
Capita Norm
ative
Daily Require
ment
(gm) |
Pancha
gar
1st
Rou
nd |
Pancha
gar
3rd
Rou
nd |
Kurig
ram
1st Rou
nd |
Kurig
ram
3rd Ro
und |
(Sirajganj) |
Netra
kona
1st
Rou
nd |
Netr
akona
3rd
Ro
und |
(Chittagong) |
Bog
ra
1st Ro
und |
Bo
gra
3rd Ro
und |
| Items |
Shahza
dpur
1st
Rou
nd |
Shahza
dpur
3rd Rou
nd |
Boalk
hali
1st Ro
und |
Boalk
hali
3rd
Ro
und |
| Rice |
397 |
12.94 |
10.22 |
12.94 |
10.10 |
12.38 |
10.66 |
15.29 |
10.53 |
14.32 |
11.34 |
13.79 |
10.31 |
| Wheat |
40 |
12.90 |
7.50 |
12.90 |
5.00 |
12.00 |
7.50 |
10.00 |
7.50 |
12.90 |
7.50 |
13.75 |
10.00 |
| Pulses
|
40 |
28.52 |
25.06 |
28.18 |
26.58 |
27.65 |
26.38 |
29.54 |
24.57 |
30.22 |
23.98 |
29.91 |
24.97 |
| Milk
(cow) |
58 |
10.47 |
10.74 |
13.14 |
13.01 |
11.54 |
16.30 |
16.55 |
16.03 |
16.39 |
16.45 |
8.94 |
12.30 |
| Oil
(mustard) |
20 |
60.48 |
59.27 |
57.38 |
53.14 |
60.28 |
52.18 |
72.54 |
55.85 |
96..00 |
47.60 |
55.68 |
50.54 |
| Meat
(beef) |
12 |
54.14 |
62.12 |
59.94 |
66.94 |
60.78 |
70.34 |
75.00 |
73.48 |
95.00 |
79.00 |
72.01 |
62.40 |
| Fish
(sweet water fish) |
48 |
49.28 |
45.26 |
42.75 |
45.68 |
52.26 |
64.66 |
36.90 |
64.56 |
47.52 |
60.82 |
60.69 |
45.02 |
| Potato |
27 |
4.05 |
8.88 |
4.16 |
7.92 |
7.45 |
10.29 |
5.87 |
10.22 |
6.22 |
9.78 |
3.43 |
7.89 |
| Other
Vegetables (leafy & non-leafy) |
150 |
6.37 |
5.79 |
6.83 |
5.17 |
5.77 |
6.78 |
9.29 |
6.47 |
10.96 |
10.97 |
6.09 |
5.25 |
| Sugar
(gur) |
20 |
19.25 |
21.03 |
19.80 |
22.46 |
21.36 |
27.51 |
21.56 |
25.24 |
16.89 |
22.47 |
21.19 |
22.48 |
| Fruits
(banana) |
20 |
7.20 |
6.65 |
6.24 |
6.05 |
8.71 |
7.58 |
6.72 |
12.15 |
9.78 |
12.54 |
4.20 |
6.92 |
| Total
Food Poverty Line (Tk/person/day) |
|
13.22 |
11.75 |
13.12 |
11.65 |
13.28 |
13.52 |
14.85 |
13.48 |
16.05 |
14.14 |
14.14 |
11.71 |
Table 8.2
Change in Poverty by Participation Status,
1997/98 - 1999/00:
Results for the Eligible (Target) Group
| Participation
Status |
1997/98
(1st Round) |
1999/00
(3rd Round) |
Change
in Head-Count (%) |
Change in Poverty-Gap
(%)
|
| Head-Count
|
Income-Gap
|
Poverty-Gap
|
Head-Count
|
Income-Gap
|
Poverty-Gap
|
| Regular
|
0.684
|
0.4341
|
0.2969
|
0.599
|
0.4284
|
0.2566
|
-12.4
|
-13.6
|
| Occasional
|
0.665
|
0.4637
|
0.3084
|
0.590
|
0.4663
|
0.2751
|
-11.3
|
-10.8
|
| Non-Participant
|
0.624
|
0.4901
|
0.3058
|
0.581
|
0.4702
|
0.2732
|
-6.9
|
-10.7
|
Note:
"Eligible" group refers to conventional target group status
with land ownership less than 50 dec. of land
Table 8.3
Poverty Dynamics by Organizational Status,
Round-1 and Round-3:
Results for the Eligible Group
| |
Round-1
|
Round-3
|
Change
in Head-Count (%) |
Change
in Poverty-Gap
(%)
|
| Head-Count
|
Income-Gap
|
Poverty-Gap
|
Head-Count
|
Income-Gap
|
Poverty-Gap
|
| Grameen
Bank
(114) |
0.640
|
0.485
|
0.307
|
0.623
|
0.444
|
0.277
|
-2.7
|
-9.8
|
| BRAC
(80) |
0.612
|
0.404
|
0.247
|
0.550
|
0.439
|
0.241
|
-10.1
|
-2.4
|
| Sabalamby
(58) |
0.672
|
0.526
|
0.353
|
0.603
|
0.360
|
0.217
|
-10.3
|
-38.5
|
| Nobeky
(98) |
0.622
|
0.484
|
0.301
|
0.643
|
0.468
|
0.301
|
3.4
|
0
|
| Prottayshi
(57) |
0.614
|
0.617
|
0.379
|
0.456
|
0.485
|
0.221
|
-25.7
|
-41.7
|
| Any
Combination within the set of Large 4 MFIs and Small NGO
(464) |
0.679
|
0.472
|
0.320
|
0.619
|
0.461
|
0.285
|
-8.8 |
-10.9
|
| All
Others
(265) |
0.687
|
0.416
|
0.286
|
0.581
|
0.445
|
0.259
|
-15.4
|
-9.4
|
Note:
Large 4 MFIs refer to Grameen Bank, BRAC, Proshika and ASA. The
poverty estimates for the last two MFIs are not shown separately
because of the small sample size.
Table
8.4
Poverty Estimates by Program Participation
and Target Group Status,
1997/98, Consumption Expenditure Data
| |
FGT
Poverty Measures |
| Head-Count
|
FGT
Poverty-Gap |
Squared
Poverty-Gap |
| All
Village |
|
|
|
|
Target non-participants
|
75.8
|
25.7
|
11.0
|
|
Target participants
|
75.0
|
23.2
|
9.3
|
|
Non-target participants
|
56.5
|
13.9
|
4.8
|
|
Non-target non-participants
|
44.6
|
12.1
|
4.5
|
| Program
Village |
|
|
|
|
Target Non-participants
|
75.0
|
25.1
|
10.7
|
|
Target Participants
|
75.0
|
23.2
|
9.3
|
|
Non-target participants
|
56.6
|
13.9
|
4.8
|
|
Non-target non-participants
|
42.2
|
11.0
|
3.9
|
| Control
Village |
|
|
|
|
Target non-participants
|
78.3
|
27.9
|
12.3
|
|
Non-target non-participants
|
52.9
|
16.3
|
6.7
|
Note: Estimated food poverty line is
Tk. 4906 per person per year, non-food poverty line ¾ Tk.
3070 per person per year, yielding total poverty line of Tk. 7976
per person per year. The food poverty line estimation procedure
follows Ravallion and Sen (1996). The non-food poverty line is based
on the upper poverty line method as described in World Bank (1998).
Source: Based on the PKSF Census data for 1997/98.
Table 8. 5
Determinants of Consumption of the Poor
|
Variable Description
|
Poor
(All Village)
|
Poor
(Program Village)
|
| Regression
Coefficient |
‘t’
value |
Regression
Coefficient |
‘t’
value |
| Household/Individual
Level |
|
|
|
|
| Assets
|
|
|
|
|
| 1
|
Log
of land owned |
0.0643
|
13.53*
|
0.0654
|
13.18*
|
| 2
|
Percentage
of cultivated land rented-in (kind payment) |
0.0006
|
2.89*
|
0.0006
|
2.85*
|
| 3
|
Percentage
of cultivated land rented-in (cash payment) |
0.0014
|
5.53*
|
0.0014
|
5.39*
|
| 4
|
Log
of non-land assets |
0.0159
|
5.08*
|
0.0149
|
4.44*
|
| Demography
|
|
|
|
|
| 5
|
Sex
of household head |
-0.1490
|
-4.60*
|
-0.1869
|
-5.42*
|
| 6
|
Log
of earning members |
0.1424
|
8.72*
|
0.1393
|
8.18*
|
| 7
|
Proportion
of non-agricultural workers |
0.0458
|
2.91*
|
0.0499
|
3.03*
|
| 8
|
Households
size |
0.0504
|
18.51*
|
0.0480
|
17.31*
|
| 9
|
Age
of household head |
0.0125
|
3.61*
|
0.0113
|
3.10*
|
| 10
|
Square
of household head |
-0.001
|
-4.23*
|
-0.0001
|
-3.57*
|
| 11
|
Age
of spouse |
0.0025
|
3.64*
|
0.0022
|
2.98*
|
| Education
|
|
|
|
|
| 12
|
Household
head, below primary |
0.0978
|
5.33*
|
0.01045
|
5.43*
|
| 13
|
Household
head, primary graduate |
|